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ABSTRACT
Clinical decision support tools (DST) promise improved health-
care outcomes by offering data-driven insights. While effec-
tive in lab settings, almost all DSTs have failed in practice.
Empirical research diagnosed poor contextual fit as the cause.
This paper describes the design and field evaluation of a rad-
ically new form of DST. It automatically generates slides for
clinicians’ decision meetings with subtly embedded machine
prognostics. This design took inspiration from the notion of
Unremarkable Computing, that by augmenting the users’ rou-
tines technology/AI can have significant importance for the
users yet remain unobtrusive. Our field evaluation suggests
clinicians are more likely to encounter and embrace such a
DST. Drawing on their responses, we discuss the importance
and intricacies of finding the right level of unremarkable-
ness in DST design, and share lessons learned in prototyping
critical AI systems as a situated experience.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The idea of leveraging machine intelligence in healthcare
in the form of decision support tools (DSTs) has fascinated
healthcare and AI researchers for decades. These tools often
promise insights on patient diagnosis, treatment options, and
likely prognosis. With the adoption of electronic medical
records and the explosive technical advances in machine
learning (ML) in recent years, now seems a perfect time for
DSTs to impact healthcare practice.
Interestingly, almost all these tools have failed when mi-
grating from research labs to clinical practice in the past
30 years [5, 7, 8]. In a review of deployed DSTs, healthcare
researchers ranked the lack of HCI considerations as the
most likely reason for failure [11, 22]. This includes a lack
of consideration for clinicians’ workflow and the collabora-
tive nature of clinical work. The interaction design of most
clinical decision support tools instead assumes that individ-
ual clinicians will recognize when they need help, walk up
and use a system that is separate from the electronic health
record, and that they want and will trust the system’s output.
We are collaborating with biomedical researchers on the
design of a DST supporting the decision to implant an ar-
tificial heart. The artificial heart, VAD (ventricular assist
device), is an implantable electro-mechanical device used to
partially replace heart function. For many end-stage heart
failure patients who are not eligible for or able to receive a
heart transplant, VADs offer the only chance to extend their
lives. Unfortunately, many patients who received VADs die
shortly after the implant [2]. In this light, a DST that can
predict the likely trajectory a patient will take post-implant,
should help identify the patients who are mostly likely to
benefit from the therapy.
We draw insight from a field study investigating the VAD
decision processes, searching for opportunities where ML
might help [25]. The findings revealed that clinicians are
unlikely to encounter or to actively engage with a DST for
help at the time and place of decision making. For most
cases, they did not find the implant decision challenging;
thus, they had no desire for computational support. In ad-
dition, the extremely hierarchical healthcare culture strati-
fied senior physicians who make implant decisions and the
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mid-level clinicians who use computers. Almost no VAD
decision-making took place in front of a computer.
Embracing the rich context of the implant decision, we
designed a radically new DST that automatically generates
slides for the required decision meeting. The design em-
beds prognostic decision supports into the corner of decision
meeting slides. We wanted decision makers to encounter the
computational advice at a relevant time and place across the
decision process, and we wanted this support to only slow
them down for the few cases where the DST adds value to
the decision. This design draws inspiration from Tolmie et
al.’s notion of Unremarkable Computing, that technology
needs to have the right level of remarkableness to valuably
situate itself in people emerging routines and becoming the
glue of their everyday lives [21].
This paper presents this DST’s interaction design as well
as a field evaluation at three VAD implant hospitals. We
also spoke with physicians working on clinical decisions
outside of VAD implant, probing whether this design might
generalize to other critical, clinical decisions. Our findings
suggest that clinicians are more likely to encounter and em-
brace a DST that binds “unremarkable" decision supports
with their current work routine. Drawing on clinicians’ re-
sponses, we discuss the importance and intricacies of finding
the right level of unremarkableness in a DST design. We dis-
cuss lessons learned and unexpected challenges in evaluating
critical AI systems as a situated experience.
This paper makes two contributions. First, we offer one
concrete solution to the long-standing challenge of effec-
tively situating DSTs in clinical practice. Second, we offer a
rare description of clinicians’ responses to a DST situated in
their workflow. This surfaced intriguing insights valuable
for future investigations of critical AI systems.
2 RELATEDWORK
Clinical Decision Support Tools in Practice
Clinical decision support tools (DSTs) are computational
systems that support one of three tasks: diagnosing patients,
selecting treatments, or making prognostic predictions of
the likely course of a disease or outcome of a treatment [24].
This project focuses on clinician-facing, prognostic DSTs.
A significant strand of recent HCI work focused on critical
issues in this area, including AI interpretability and fairness,
data visualization, accuracy of risk communication, andmore
[17, 18, 20]. The significance of this body of work has led
some to describe it as “the rise of design science in clinical
DST research" [1]. These studies typically investigated DST
in lab settings, using prototypes that are dedicated to a single
clinical decision. Clinicians came out of their day-to-day
workflow, used these systems for a pre-identified task, then
provided feedback on the system design.
Despite success in labs, the vast majority of clinician-
facing DSTs failed when moving to clinical practice. Clin-
icians rarely use them [4, 5, 23], and therefore they have
shown no significant improvement on healthcare outcomes.
Healthcare researchers identified a lack of HCI consideration,
rather than poor technical performance, as the main cause
of these failures [15, 19]. These HCI considerations include
workflow integration, integration with social context, and
clinicians’ lack of motivation to use a DST.
Relatively few research projects have focused on how
to integrate DST output into clinical contexts. Within HCI
there are initiatives to engage with real clinical users and
contexts, yet the lack of meaningful access remains a major
barrier. Researchers have shared that they were not allowed
to evaluate incomplete designs, that evaluations took months
or even years, that iterative design or repeated evaluation
was not possible, and finally, that design evaluations had to
be conducted by healthcare professionals rather than by HCI
professionals [3, 9, 14].
VAD Decision-Making and Its Context
Due to many of the aforementioned barriers, investigations
of the VAD implant decision making and field assessment of
DST designs are rare. An exception is a field study conducted
at three VAD programs [25]. Researchers made a number of
observations that informed this work:
First, clinicians perceived no need for computational sup-
port; They considered most patient cases as textbook cases
that follow a standard, systematic process of therapy escala-
tion and a staged unfolding of decision considerations.
Second, clinicians made implant decisions during daily
rounding of patient wards, during hallway conversations,
and in multidisciplinary VAD decision meetings. Decisions
were rarely discussed or made in front of a computer.
Finally, the clinical workplace culture was strongly hi-
erarchical yet highly collaborative. Cardiologists and sur-
geons, who function at the top of the hierarchy, decided who
gets classified as a difficult case and who gets discussed dur-
ing the required multidisciplinary meeting which the whole
VAD team attends. This cultural context poses a two-fold
challenge for DST use. First, decision makers (physicians)
and computer users (the midlevel clinicians, including nurse
practitioners, social workers and VAD coordinators) rarely
overlap at any point of the decision-making process. Second,
physicians have great trust in their colleagues’ suggestions,
much more so than in computational support.
3 DESIGN PROCESS AND RATIONALE
We set out to design a new form of DST for VAD patient
selection to explore how to overcome its real-world adoption
barriers that many prognostic DSTs face. Drawing upon prior
work, we had two design goals:
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1 - Embedding DST in current workflow: Clinicians, espe-
cially cardiologists and surgeons, need to naturally encounter
the DST within their current decision-making workflow, be-
cause they are unlikely to recognize when they might need
help and then walk up to a computer for help;
2 - Slowing down decision-making only when necessary:
The DST outputs need to be easily ignored in most patient
cases that are textbook. However, it should also be present
enough to slow the decision-making down when there is a
meaningful disagreement between the clinicians’ view and
the DSTs view of the situation;
These orientations are very different from the convention
of DST design in which decision supports are always avail-
able, waiting for clinicians to walk up and use at any point
across the decision-making process. Instead, we wanted to
tailor the DST for particular moments in the process, such
that clinicians do not have to take pause and invent se-
quences of action anew. We wanted the DST to naturally
augment the actions of decision making, rather than pulling
the user away from doing their routine work.
Making Clinical DST Unremarkable
Tolmie et al. [21] introduced the notion of unremarkable com-
puting when discussing how ubiquitous computing should
arrive and create its place in people’s homes. They argued
that technology can augment people’s actions in ways that
have a wealth of significance but seem unremarkable, be-
cause its interactions are “so highly situated, so fitting, so
natural”. They argued that home technology should not only
be more intelligent, it should also be more subservient to
people’s daily routines. In doing so, the technology becomes
part of the routines, part of the very glue of their everyday
life.
We draw connections between this ambition and our afore-
mentioned design goals. We also draw connections between
this notion of routine and VAD decision making. While these
are daunting life-and-death decisions, the implant decisions
are part of a work routine for clinicians. To fit a DST into their
practice, we need to make it subservient to the day-to-day
decision-making workflow they engage in.
We wanted to operationalize this idea of unremarkable
technology in the context of critical, clinical decision making.
This is a difficult goal because it requires a right level of
“unremarkableness" such that the DST does not constrain
clinicians’ decision making flow except when it needs to.
Design Process
To situate a DST into the current VAD decision-making rou-
tine, we first needed to identify a time and place where
clinicians should naturally and impactfully encounter the it.
We chose the multidisciplinary patient evaluation meetings,
for a number of reasons. First, the meeting is a rare social
touch point where most clinicians involved in the decision
are present, and they are actively forming a collective de-
cision about patient treatment. Second, it is one of the few
decision points where a computer is present and being used.
Third, decision meetings are common across hospital sites.
VAD centers in the US are legally required to take a mul-
tidisciplinary approach to patient care, therefore regularly
scheduled meetings are common. Globally, these meetings
are also recommended [16]. Fourth, multidisciplinary meet-
ings have become an increasingly common best practice in
organ transplantation [13]. Designing DST for decision meet-
ings therefore could potentially generalize beyond VADs to
include a number of other clinical decisions.
Next, we considered how to fit the DST comfortably within
the meetings. Drawing lessons from prior work [12, 25], we
wanted to embed the DST into Electronic Medical Records
(EMR) to minimize the effort needed from clinicians to type
in patient information. We also wanted to augment clini-
cians’ paperwork to provide them additional motivation for
adoption. We therefore integrated the DST output into a
meeting slide generator, a system that automatically extracts
patient information from EMR and populates slides for the
decision meeting, which could be projected or printed.
We sketched what the DST predictions output might look
like. We iterated on the design based on feedback of two col-
laborating clinicians (an attending Cardiologist and a nurse
practitioner). The final design was a small line chart that
showed a patient’s predicted chance of survival (Figure 1). It
also showed the most likely causes of death, such as right
ventricular failure or renal failure.
We placed this chart in the top-right corner of the slide
summarizing an individual patient’s current state. The sub-
tlety was a deliberate choice toward achieving the right level
of unremarkableness. In the most common case, when the
DST agreed with the clinicians’ assessment, the visual dis-
play of the agreement could help clinicians gain trust in the
system without slowing them down. In the rare case that the
DST prediction conflicted with the clinicians’ assessment,
the DST could slow the decision down. Everyone attending
the meeting would see the disagreement. We speculated this
would apply social pressure on the senior physicians to ratio-
nalize and articulate their decision making. We speculated
it could also encourage the medical students, residents and
other mid-level clinicians to participate in the discussion
when they disagreed with the senior clinician’s decision. It
could allow them to disagree by pointing to the conflict with
the DST and not claiming that they personally knew more
than the senior physician.
We worked out the detailed contents of the slide with the
two collaborating clinicians. We also referenced the meeting
printouts and workup checklists currently in use.
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Figure 1: The decision meeting slide design. We designed a DST that automatically generates decision-meeting slides for clin-
icians with subtly embedded machine prognostics at the top right corner.
We wanted to finalize the design by populating with real
patient data. However, a variety of policies and legal regu-
lations would not allow this. As a work-around, we asked
our clinical collaborators to help us populate the slides with
synthetic patient cases. Interestingly, they found it very chal-
lenging to generate a prototypical patient case including
dozens of vital signs and test results. They instead selected
elements across several of their former cases, removing iden-
tifiable demographic information and molding parts of the
medical condition to disguise the identity.
In our final design (Figure 1), the DST outputs are in the
top right corner of the slide, next to a summarized patient
history visualization. Patient test results are categorized and
put in the center. The patient demographics and links to
social and financial evaluations are on the left.
4 DESIGN ASSESSMENT
We had several questions we wanted to answer with our as-
sessment, including: (1)Would clinicians naturally encounter
the DST within their current workflow? (2) Would clinicians
accept computational decision support in the public context
of the meeting? (3) Does placing the prediction in the corner
present the right amount of unremarkability? Specifically,
does the DST get ignored when its predictions align with
the clinicians’ judgment, and would it slow decisions down
when its output conflicts with clinicians?
Assessment in VAD Implant Centers
We gained access to three hospitals that regularly perform
VAD implantation, all within the US. Two were sites from
our formative field study and one was new. The facilities
varied geographically and in scale. The smallest we studied
performs about 40 VAD implants a year; the largest performs
over 100.
We wanted to assess our design within the context of an
actual implant decision meeting in order to observe whether
it impacted discussion. Unfortunately, this proved to be im-
practical. None of the sites would allow us to present slides
showing information for the patients they were currently
implanting. All felt this could impact the life and death de-
cision. The clinicians doing the VAD implants were quite
busy. They would only agree to interact with a single design.
They did not have the time for us to make revisions and
then revisit. Finally, one of the sites had a specific policy
preventing us from observing the decision meeting. They
would only participate in one-on-one interviews.
In reaction to these restrictions, we re-designed the as-
sessment process with the goal of making the most use of
our participant pool within one round of assessment. We
carried out all following procedures in hospital C. In hospi-
tal B, we carried out all except (3) presenting at a decision
meeting. In hospital A, we carried out all procedures except
(4) interviewing all physicians and surgeons.
(1) At each site, we first interviewed the mid-levels to
understand their practice around the decisionmeeting, and to
probe the DST design’s fit in their respective hospitals. When
necessary, we adjusted the designs to fit specific hospital’s
routine practice;
(2) Our research collaborator at each site recommended
one attending physician to be our confederate. We conducted
interviews with them, discussing the DST design, and con-
firming there was no glaring mismatch between the design
and the practice at their respective sites;
(3) The confederate physician presented the patient case
with theDST on display in the decisionmeeting.We observed
clinicians’ responses and discussions;
(4) Finally, we interviewed the rest of the VAD team to
further individually discuss the DST design.
In total, we interviewed nine attending cardiologists or sur-
geons and eight mid-level clinicians. Each interview lasted
for at least one hour. The DST design was presented in two
hospitals’ multidisciplinary decision meetings. Field notes
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were recorded using pen and paper. Interviews were audio-
recorded and transcribed.We analyzed our data using affinity
diagrams [10] and by performing thematic analysis.
Assessing Generalizability of the DST Design
We chose to situate the DST within slides used for decision
meetings partially because these meetings are best practices
in other critical medical domains as well. To gain some in-
sights as to if this design might generalize, we chose to probe
a small set of clinicians from other medical domains who
participate in these meetings.
To recruit these participants, we asked participants from
the VAD study to help us identify other clinical domains
and decisions that have interdisciplinary decision meetings.
We then interviewed 6 physicians whose practices include
decisions meetings for pediatric surgery, pediatric critical
care, adult cardio-thoracic surgery, internal medicine emer-
gency care, orthopedic surgery, and obstetrics/gynecology.
We audio-recorded, transcribed and analyzed these inter-
views using the same methods as we used for our VAD par-
ticipants.
5 DESIGN ASSESSMENT FINDINGS
Wefirst offer an overview of observations from the individual
sites, describing the different cultures, facilities, and practices.
We then report findings across the three sites related to the
aforementioned assessment goals: the likelihood of encoun-
tering DST during decision-making, the acceptance of DST,
the right level of remarkableness, and finally, generalizability
to other kinds of medical decisions.
Overview
Hospital A was the least technologically advanced. They
recently transitioned from paper-based to electronic clinical
records. Phone signals generally did not penetrate the build-
ing, built in the late 1800s. Many common web services, such
as Google search, were blocked on their internal network.
The weekly meeting took place in a long, grandiose, turn-
of-the-century board room. This contained one long, 40-seat
table above which hung four large chandeliers. At one end
of the table (the “head” of the table) there was a portable, low
resolution projector. They sat according to an unspoken seat
chart based on clinical role hierarchy. Physicians sat near
the head end, and a small group of these physicians would
present the individual cases. Nurses sat near the middle. So-
cial workers and others sat farthest from the projector. Only
participants sitting near the head of the table participated in
the discussion. The content on the projector screen was also
too small to read since most sat far from the screen. They all
interacted with bulky printouts of EMR data for each patient
discussed.
Hospital B had in-house statisticians dedicated to outcome
analysis and patient risk modeling. The physicians and this
site were also actively involved in VAD risk modeling re-
search. Interestingly, when it came to using a risk model to
inform their own implant decisions, they described them-
selves as “very minimalist despite all these interests in ML.”
Cardiologists and surgeons led implant decision making both
within and outside of the implant meetings. Meeting partic-
ipants did not vote on how to proceed. Hospital B did not
provide us authorization to observe its decision meeting.
Hospital C was more technology-friendly. The meeting
room had large projector, which most participants could
read. In addition, participants had access to a printout of
the presented materials. One program manager and two
mid-level clinicians arrived more than 40 minutes before
the meeting to set up the computer, projector, and remote
conference connections. As the presenting physicians spoke,
a seasoned nurse practitioner operated the computer, pulling
out and zooming into relevant patient information from EMR.
This nurse practitioner had been performing this role for
more than 5 years. Physicians and mid-levels used laptops
to search for relevant information in the EMR or online and
to add items to their digital to-do lists. Many more people
engaged in discussing the patients. Following the discussion
of each patient, all clinicians present voted on the next step.
Hospital C had previously experimented with bringing
computational predictions into their meetings. Cardiologists
chose a model that had been nationally validated through
five randomized clinical trials. They had a nurse practitioner
input all of the data for each patient discussed and show
the DST prediction in the decision meeting. One year later,
they stopped this practice because two recent journal articles
reported that the models used were “horribly mis-calibrated”.
“That was a lot of work to type in all that sh-t and generate
that number, and that’s not that helpful.” Their EMR held four
other implant outcome prediction models, which predicted
things such as the chance of depression. However, the clin-
icians never used these models, stating that each required
manually entry of all of a patient’s data.
Likelihood of Encountering DST in Workflow
Our observations suggested that most clinicians involved
in the VAD implant decision would likely encounter the
DST output if it was included as part of an individual pa-
tient’s information presented at the decision meeting. All
three facilities hosted a weekly implant decision meeting.
Clinicians of all ranks and roles attended, ranging from sea-
soned surgeons to residents, to nurse practitioners to social
workers to palliative care coordinators. Although the weight
that the meetings carried for influencing an implant deci-
sion appeared to vary across the three sites, the occurrence
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of the meetings was one of the few events that happened
everywhere.
These meetings offered one of the extremely few situa-
tions where senior clinicians actively discussed decisions
in proximity of a computer. Meetings in all three hospitals
had a shared computer projecting patient information. Two
hospitals projected dedicated meeting materials. The other
projected patient profiles from the EMR. Clinicians described
the other key decision points as “just talk on the fly” with
no EMR access or paper records in hand. The other decision
points most often only included attending physicians and
surgeons. “Everything is happening live.” Mid-level clini-
cians, who spend more time with each individual patient, did
not participate in the decisions made outside of the meeting.
Acceptance of DST in Decision Meetings
None of our interview participants expressed any resistance
to the including DST output within the context of the deci-
sion meeting. One site (Hospital C) had already made the
effort to manually include DST data into their meeting but
had abandoned this practice due to their loss of confidence
in its quality. Seasoned physicians and surgeons voiced their
appreciation for what a prognostic DST might bring, stating
that it would “give its perspective” and offer a chance for an
“occasional recalibration.” Clinicians also shared that making
an objective decision could sometimes be hard. The decision
to not implant was usually a death sentence for a patient.
“When I really like this patient, really want to help him or her,
it sometimes helps to get a more factual view.”
Seasoned physicians shared that their dream DST should
play a role similar to mid-level clinicians. They should pro-
vide additional context for the seasoned physicians’ decision.
The DST could provide additional context and a different
perspective to the senior physicians. They recognized the
value a DST might bring from its statistical consideration
across many cases. “The value is you are looking at thousands
of cases, I’m looking at 100 and overweighting the last three I
saw.” They also shared that input from mid-levels was not
always “taken really into account”.
Mid-levels agreed they only inform and support the dis-
cussions. They did not make decisions.
My role in selecting patients for VAD... hmm. I don’t
select patients. But I do talk about it... We are there to
help discuss patients. (Nurse practitioner, B2)
Mid-level clinicians enthusiastically welcomed the idea of
a decision meeting slide generator. They envisioned a num-
ber of possible benefits. They shared that the slide generator
would automate work that is not currently billable. At hospi-
tal A and B, meeting slides were prepared by staff who had
little to no medical training. Physicians could get frustrated
with the result, characterizing the unfiltered materials as
being prepared by “amateurs.” These staff members could
not personalize patient presentations because they could
not risk skipping information that might prove to be critical.
Mid-levels felt they could benefit from the automation and
seasoned physicians felt they would benefit by the removal
of the copious, irrelevant data being pulled out of the EMR.
Mid-level clinicians viewed the slides as a potentially im-
portant vehicle for communicating their opinions to physi-
cians. In all three hospitals, senior physicians set the agenda
for decisionmeetings. They decidedwhich patients to present,
and during the meeting, they called out the information that
they felt was important enough to discuss. This hierarchical
culture was well captured by the design of a custom patient
review tool at hospital C. Two VAD coordinators customized
a patient review dashboardwithin EMR in order to help them-
selves better track medical tests and share results within the
team. Although cardiologists and surgeons rarely used the
tool, they controlled which pieces of information could be
placed on the dashboard and which elements would not be
included when the patient case was classified as urgent.
Mid-levels often doubted that their voice was heard or
that their expertise was considered. They were hesitant to
directly disagree with a physician. They described the sit-
uation as more complicated than just the power dynamics.
They shared that the cardiologists were incentivized to im-
plant more patients and to implant sicker patients. They
found themselves often advocating for patient mortality (let
the patient die). Mid-levels felt their opinions focused on
post-implant quality of life. Unlike the physicians, mid-levels
worked intimately “with all the problems that can come from
a patient that maybe shouldn’t have been implanted.” They
noted there was no right or wrong answer between length
of life and quality of life. They shared it was often hard to
argue with great confidence that letting patients die was
better than offering them a small chance to live. In such situ-
ations, mid-levels frequently cited “you never know what will
happen” as a reason to not to pursue further discussion with
attending physicians. Some shared that over time, they had
slowly removed themselves from the decision making.
There is risk stratification for each patient, but I don’t
know... It’s like, we talk about it, but I don’t know if it’s
really taken really into account. (Nurse practitioner,
B2)
Mid-levels consider the ability to organize the contents
of meeting slides as one way to increase their influence.
Meeting slides provide additional, visual presence they could
use in support of the facts they felt were important. This
would make it less like they were only sharing an opinion
with the physicians. The meeting slides could be facts in a
space where only the seasoned physicians’ opinions carried
any weight. They felt the formality the meeting slides carried
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was unparalleled to any other artifact they had access to. A
prognostic DST that indicates post-surgery quality of life
could potentially amplify their voices.
There is not a way to present (my reasoning) formally.
It’s just me saying: ‘This, this and this’. [...] I think it’s
good to have something visual for anybody to see. It’s
like, OK. LOOK. Let’s slow down a bit here. (Nurse
practitioner)
Intricacies of Making DST Unremarkable
Both seasoned physicians and mid-levels expressed appre-
ciation for DSTs that could slow them down “only when
necessary". They liked this aspect of our design. However,
we could not easily conclude whether our specific design
had achieved this goal. Instead, clinicians’ discussions and
questions, which we will soon describe, depicted many un-
expected intricacies in this notion of the “right" level of
unremarkableness.
Challenges of Engaging Synthetic Patient Cases via Data. Clin-
icians shared that they could not draw on their experience of
making critical clinical decisions seeing only patient data on
paper. This presented the biggest barrier to assessing how
clinicians might respond to a conflicting DST prediction.
Patient history data alone did not give clinicians enough
confidence tomake an implant decision. Physicians described
the meeting data as merely a surrogate for the actual patient.
The data did not allow them to see patients “as a whole.” They
stressed that to understand a patient clinically, they needed
to “look at the patient, talk to the patient, take care of the
patient.” Social workers shared that they had not met with
this patient nor talked to their family. In our field evaluation,
presentations of the synthetic patient cases were always
followed by a long, awkward silence.
A very sick but highly motivated patient can do better
than their illness would otherwise be left them, com-
pared to a less sick, less motivated patient. These things
are hard to capture. The eyeball tests. (Surgeon, B6)
Clinicians also had wildly different readings into the same
DST prognostics. We presented the same two synthetic cases
with the same implant survival predictions to all participants.
Interestingly, they generated wildly different reactions and
interpretations of the cases. Some viewed the survival esti-
mate as implying that an implant would notwork. “Gee... VAD
is futile here.” Others viewed the DST output as implying the
patient should be immediately implanted, before things got
worse. ‘‘We still have a chance.” Few clinicians believed that
all VAD implant candidates would have a similar prognosis
as the synthetic case we presented: “This chart is meaningless.
Every VAD candidate’s projection would look like this.”
That the data was based upon synthetic patient cases made
any real discussion about the patient even more difficult.
Instead, clinicians started to focus on the DST prognostics.
They probed on where the model comes from. It took a long
time for us to explain the data source and the ML mechanism
to clinicians with no ML experience and without a deep
understanding of statistics. It took even longer to explain it
to clinicians with statistical depth and ML experience. They
fixated on the fact that the ML systems’ performance was
not the focus of our assessment. The synthetic patient data
often turned this into an assessment of the DST’s quality in
the minds of many meeting participants.
Is the Model Validated by Clinical Trials? Clinicians com-
monly expressed a need to know more about the model’s
source and credibility. When they learned that the model
presented has not been rigorously validated through clinical
trials and published in prestigious clinical journals, they sug-
gested we were wasting their time. Physicians and surgeons
considered discussing an unvalidated model unethical; as
misleading as “looking at a crystal ball”. Others tended to
judge DST quality based on the journal it was published in.
Physicians also desired a model that had been validated
with data from their own hospital. “It’s better to be home-
grown.” Models should be published in a good journal and
then validated in a national scale study across several implant
centers. Some suggested including links to the peer reviewed
clinical trial within the DST output on the slide. It “lends a
lot of weight to a clinical model”.
Are the Predictions Based on Clinicians’ Best Efforts? Physi-
cians highlighted that the predictive models, regardless of
how well they measure medical uncertainties, would never
replace human, clinical decision-making. They viewed their
own decision making as focused on managing and reducing
uncertainties. “If we think that we will be able to tell everybody
what to do based on a model, we ignore the fact that we also
have tools and mechanisms for dealing with the uncertainty
that is inherent when putting VADs in patients.” (Cardiologist)
Many clinicians’ questions, as well as their discussion
around the DSTs, revealed a tension between what they
saw as the DST’s static view of patient conditions and the
clinicians’ desire and ability to also focus on future actions
and interventions. They wanted to know which modifiable
factors most influenced the DST predictions. They wanted
to be able to offer treatments that they could improve these
factors, thus increasing the likelihood of a positive surgical
outcome at some time in the future.
These predictions are (what will happen) despite our
best efforts, right? (VAD manager, C8)
Having an understanding of what’s driving the risk
[features that most influence the prediction] is very im-
portant for us to understand what is modifiable at that
patient. [...] Is it age or something we cannot change?
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Otherwise there is a lot of potential here. (Hospital C
decision meeting)
Clinicians did not seem to actively make the subtle but
critical distinction between features that were important
to predicting an outcome and features that are causal to
that outcome. For example, an observation that people are
carrying umbrellas can be used to predict that it will rain.
However, taking people’s umbrellas away will not prevent
rain. ML systems make predictions based on covariance of
features. They do not assess the causality of those features.
When prompted, clinicians claimed that this distinction is
“absolutely important”. However, in our conversations, we
did not observe them distinguishing ML predictions from
general statistics. They seemed to strongly believed DSTs
should be able to distinguish causality from prediction and
that they should present only causal features. “This is the
whole point of statistical processes. A DSTmodel should address
that, right?"
There was a sense that if the DST predictions were not
based on causal factors, then the predictions should not be
presented at all. Clinicians described differentiating correla-
tion (predication) versus causality as a central part of their
decision making. For example, many patients being eval-
uated for left-ventricular VAD also have right-ventricular
heart failure. An important decision cardiologists must make
is whether the heart failure on the right was caused by the
left heart failure or if it is independent. Will fixing only the
left side also fix the right? Currently, clinicians speculate
by probing patients with medication. They try different left
heart medications and observe how the right side responds.
Clinicians wanted help: “If you can help us understand [...]
which factors seem to be most dominant, or most closely asso-
ciated with certain outcomes, then that helps.” They wanted
to know the causal links and features for individual cases.
Are Data-Driven Prognostics Facts OR Predictions? Clinicians
frequently asked us to clarify whether DST prognostics are
predictions that carry agency and subjectivity, or if predic-
tions are facts rooted in historic data. We sensed they wanted
to limit discussions to facts, including how heart failure has
played out for the patient theywere treating and the statistics
from previous, similar cases. We observed resistance from
some clinicians toward the idea of showing predictions. Our
collaborating physicians, who created the synthetic cases
and helped us select contents for the slides suggested that
the DST output should be “one statistical representation of
100 patients who are similar to him” rather than a prediction
for this individual patient.
I think if you continue to call it “VAD projections” 65%,
people are going to poke holes at it. They are gonna try
to prove you wrong. This [DST projection] is just what
the historical outcomes were. But this guy is different,
this guy has his own things that make him special.
(Collaborating cardiologist, hospital A)
Are the Predictions IndividualMedicine OR PopulationMedicine?
Most clinicians share that they thought of DST output as an
“average”. They seemed to find the notion of personalized
predictions difficult to grasp. Some voiced strong concerns
that using DST was the same as applying “populational statis-
tics” to individual patient decision making. They felt this was
unethical. Others proposed that “instead of having one model
that we apply to the entire population, we would have a group
of models. Those models predict for that group of patients.”
(Surgeon, B4)
What Does “Now” Mean in DST Predictions? The DST vi-
sualized the patient outcome predictions, including life ex-
pectancy, estimated time until right heart failure, and likely
cause of death. For example, Figure 1 shows that the pa-
tient’s post-implant life expectancy is 21 days if a VAD was
implanted now, under the condition shown on the slides.
Clinicians were confused by this notion of “now” because
it was extremely unlikely that they would implant a patient
on the same day as the decision meeting. Is “that 21 days
from today? If we are gonna lose the patient in 21 days [21
days following after implant], can we just wait?”
DSTs Do Not Account For the X Factors. Clinicians said that
the DST would only ever be one factor in their decision
because of “X factors”; the many factors beyond a patient’s
condition that impacts the implant decision. One X factors
they spoke of was O/E ratio (observed-to-expected mortality
ratio). The O/E ratio is a rating that measures the surgeon
and care teams’ performance. Surgeons cared about keeping
a high rating. They described the implant decision for high-
risk patients as “taking on new O/E ratio debts.” This seemed
to strongly influence whether they take on another high-risk
patient. It seemed to depend strongly on how many patients
had recently had poor outcomes.
It’s not that we don’t help that [VAD candidate] patient,
but if we take this shot and do poorly, then we cannot
take on the next 10 patients like him. Because now we
got too much of a cluster of high-risk patients who’ve
done poorly, then we have to do some lower risk ones
before we can go back up [in O/E ratings]. Insurance
companies and Medicare and all that... they will mark
you. They may not pay. It all plays into the complex
factor for deciding who, especially sicker patients, we
would take a shot. (Surgeon, B6)
Some surgeons described that, for some cardiac surgeries
that have officially defined models used to rate surgeons and
care teams, their decision meetings had became centered
around risk models. This is not yet the case for VAD implants.
Unremarkable AI CHI 2019, May 4–9, 2019, Glasgow, Scotland Uk
Generalizability Beyond VAD
Our interviewswith clinicians outside of VAD centers showed
that multidisciplinary decision meetings take place across
many clinical domains for some of their most aggressive
interventions. They are also referred to as internal medicine
panel meetings, tumor boards, or floor meetings (referring
to meetings between critical and general care physicians).
These meetings happen widely because for patients are very
sick and are being considered for their last-option surgi-
cal intervention, their illness usually have involved multiple
organs. Treating them requires physicians frommultiple clin-
ical domains. Multidisciplinary meetings therefore occurred
naturally.
Esophageal cancer, COPD, diabetes, cystic fibrosis, LIT-
ERALLY everything in psychiatry, gastric bypass, end
stage renal disease, hernia repair, syndromes like Down
and Turner, any disease that requires management with
meds with nasty side effects, and even emergency room
situations to expedite processes. Any of the above dis-
eases the approach has to be multidisciplinary almost
by definition because they affect multiple systems and
usually but not always the last option is a surgical
intervention. (Pediatric surgeon)
6 DISCUSSION: DESIGNING AND EVALUATING
DST AS A SITUATED EXPERIENCE
Clinical DSTs, despite compelling evidence of their effective-
ness in labs, have mostly failed when moving out of labs and
into healthcare practice [15, 19]. A lack of contextual inte-
gration in the design of these systems played a critical role
in these repeated failures. Prior work suggests that current
interaction conventions, that clinicians will recognize their
own need for a DSTs help and then walk up and use a system
separate from the EMR, is not likely to work [25].
There is a real need to design DSTs not only as a functional
utility but as an integrated experience. Their effectiveness
should be measured not only by prediction accuracy, but by
effectiveness when situated within its social and physical
context such as workplace culture and social structures. This
presents exiting new opportunities and challenges to HCI
and UX research.
Our design makes three dependent proposals about mak-
ing a DST a situated VAD decision making experience. First,
we propose that the decision meeting presents a good time
and place. Second, assuming the meeting is correct, we pro-
pose that situating the DST output into the meeting slides
would offer an effective form. Third, assuming that having
the DST as part of the slides is a good form, we propose that
the DST plays a fairly unremarkable role in clinician decision
making by appearing in one corner. We claim it needs to
be easily passed over when it agrees with current decision
making and that it must only be present enough to slow de-
cision making down when its predictions are in conflict with
a seasoned physician’s suggested course of action. All three
proposals aimed to naturally augment the current activities
of decision making, rather than pulling clinicians away from
doing their routine.
Below, we discuss the design implications of these pro-
posals. We then share challenges encountered and lessons
learned in evaluating the DST as a situated experience.
Designing DST to Augment Clinical Routine
Time and Place. Findings of this work suggested that DSTs
may more effectively fit into clinical practice if their interac-
tions are tailored for a specific time and place within the cur-
rent decision-making workflow. Taking lessons from prior
HCI work, we should not only make AI more intelligent, but
make them highly situated in people’s routines. In doing so,
AI can become part of the decision-making routines, part of
the very glue of clinicians’ everyday work.
Our assessment findings largely suggest that decision
meetings are a routine activity that is promising for DST
integration, for several reasons:
(1) Themeeting is part of an existing clinical decision-making
routine. Clinicians therefore would naturally encounter
the DST at the meeting;
(2) The meeting is a socially aggregated decision point. The
DST could therefore leverage mid-level clinicians to advo-
cate for its information and value to the decision makers;
(3) The meeting offers a moment of deliberation in their
otherwise fast-moving decision-making workflow. The
meetings offer clinicians time to collectively digest the
implications of the prognostics;
(4) Finally, the meeting is a best practice promoted globally
in VAD patient care, and across several clinical domains.
Therefore this DST design could potentially make its
place across diverse practices in different hospital sites
and domains.
Decision meetings represent only one way of integrating
DSTs into clinical practice. Similar opportunities may lie in
other time and place in existing clinical decision-making
routine that is socially-aggregated, deliberative and shared
across hospitals. Future research shall advance this work by
systemically searching for such opportunities.
Interaction Form. Besides situating theDST in decision-making
routine, we alsomotivatedmid-level clinicians’ use by prepar-
ing patient information for the decision meetings for them.
Our field study suggested this was a useful tactic. DSTs sup-
porting various clinical decisions can potentially automate
tedious information retrieval tasks for clinicians to offer ad-
ditional motivations for adoption.
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Designing a Right Level of Unremarkableness
The walk-up-and-use convention of current DSTs assume
clinicians will know when they need help. Our design chal-
lenges this convention by proposing the notion of Unremark-
able AI. Our unremarkable DST is designed to be situated
naturally in an existing decision-making routine and only
noticed when it might add value to the decision. DST’s in-
teraction should have a right level of unremarkableness, yet
the information it provides should significantly impact care.
Our field assessment illustrated some positive indicators
that making DSTs unremarkable helped reduce the resistance
clinicians commonly show towards clinical DSTs [6, 19, 25].
For example, we did not observe clinicians feeling threatened
or feeling they might be replaced by the technology. Clini-
cians appreciated that DSTs could inform their discussions,
“though the discussion is unlikely to center around the DST."
While our DST was visually unremarkable, its very exis-
tence seems be, to an extent, transforming clinical decision
making. It introduced predictions into a culture rooted in
facts and statistical significance. Moreover, when predictive
risk models were used officially to measure patient risk and
clinician skills, clinicians’ decision making became centered
around thesemodels. DSTs substantialized their performance
pressure in decision making.
These observations forced us to take a step and ask: What
is the preferred role for DST to play in clinical practice?
Where does a right level of unremarkableness lie? More re-
search is needed to find the right balance between DST aug-
menting decision-making in natural and intuitive ways and
transforming the nature of clinical decision-making. Under-
standing these tradeoffs should be a critical research question
in DST design and research.
Experience Prototyping DST In-Situ
Restricted access to the clinical environment is known to
impose fundamental challenges to iterative UX design and
evaluation. Our experience of conducting the field assess-
ment echoed this. Upon reflection, we identified several tac-
tics effective at reducing the risks of our one-shot design
evaluation:
(1) Designing a generalizable DST: The work flows and so-
cial contexts in clinical practices are complex and highly
divergent across hospitals. Therefore, generalizability is
a necessity for many DST designs. This work took a step
further than hospital-site generalizablility, designing a
DST that can work for a class of structurally similar deci-
sions (data-intensive, last-option surgical interventions).
A DST’s design and evaluation can become more produc-
tive than those dedicated to one specific clinical decision
as well as specific DST models;
(2) Designing the evaluation methods for describing and
unpacking the complex, subtle, and multi-faceted nature
of experience, rather than explicitly measuring it;
(3) Using prototypes rather than functioning DST models.
This allowed us to probe various possible DST outputs
and to easily adjust our prototype to incorporate partici-
pant feedback.
The Impossibility of
Experience Prototyping Critical DSTs
Nonetheless, we encountered additional, seemingly-inevitable
challenges of assessing DST’s situated user experience. For
example, whether a DST design has indeed achieved a right
level of remarkableness was impossible to assess without
real patient data and fully functioning ML systems.
Clinicians need more than just synthetic patient cases to
connect with their own decision making. We speculate that
clinicians need to see one of their own patients’ data to really
assess the DST information design and to see what an actual
prediction would look like. This means early DST prototypes
will need actual patient data to assess their interactions in
context and their impact on care. This is currently impossible
in critical clinical cases due to ethics, policies and hospital
regulations.
Clinicians were unable to engage in a group discussion
without a fully functioning ML system. Clinicians described
using an unvalidated DST as unethical and misleading. They
suggested that a DST should be validated via randomized
clinical trials on both retrospective patients and prospective
patients, both at a national level and on their own hospital’s
patient population. This gives rise to a chicken-and-egg prob-
lem in our design assessment: Clinicians could not effectively
assess the DST design without a working DST that has been
validated on prospective patients; and validating a DST on
prospective patient data requires a DST design that has been
proven effective.
We suspect these challenges are likely to occur not only in
evaluating DSTs for artificial heart implant, but in assessing
DSTs for many other critical, high-consequence decisions as
well. As data-driven DSTs increasingly move out of research
labs and into critical decision making in the real world, we
encourage DST designers and researchers to join in mak-
ing these challenges explicit and investigating new design
assessment methods and tools to address them.
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